Opinion & Commentary
US is still a leading influence in the balance of power in Asia
It seems that not a week goes by without a big-picture thinker releasing a big-picture book or giving a big-picture sermon describing the gradual eclipse of American hegemony in Asia. True, American power will inevitably decline in relative terms as Asian giants such as China and India rise. But in Asia, at least, arguments about the end of American hegemony knock down only ‘straw men’ that were always false constructions. America was never a hegemon in Asia – only some American post-Cold War triumphalists thought it so. The nature of US power and the exercising of influence was always much more clever and subtle than most give it credit for. In fact, as India and China rise, the US could actually find itself in a stronger position that will keep it on top in Asia.
How can this be? After all, power and influence is built on the back of economic success. The Chinese economy has been doubling in size every ten years since 1978. The Indian economy has been doing the same since 1991. In contrast, it takes about two decades for the US economy to double in size. Surely this means that Asia is rushing toward a state of multipolarity – a configuration of roughly equal great powers balancing against each other – while American influence is on the wane?
The seemingly obvious conclusion would be true but for the fact that Asia has a unique kind of hierarchical security system that came about partly by accident and design.
No power can be preeminent if it cannot maintain its military power advantage over rivals. Yet, despite the fact that America spends more in defense than the next ten powers combined, it has never been a regional hegemon in the sense that it relies on the cooperation of other states to remain predominant. For example, without cooperation from allies such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore and the Philippines, the US could not retain its forward military positions in the West Pacific. The US needs the cooperation of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand to host its critical radar infrastructure in these states.
Moreover, and enormously important, in remaining preeminent, America needs other key states and regional groupings such as ASEAN to acquiesce to its security relationships. Thus, there is broad based regional approval of US alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia, as well as with partners such as Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and India. The key to the effectiveness of these bilateral relationships is that they enjoy widespread support and legitimacy as stabilizing arrangements in the region. The sum of these relationships is greater than the parts that form it.
Combined with the raw military capacity that the US brings to the table, this means that America is powerful enough to enforce the peace and provide stability for commerce to thrive. The American presence and its partnerships are complementary to Asian states’ obsession with counter-dominance and non-interference in the region. This dynamic ‘liberal order’ – in the main fair, flexible and open enough to welcome new entrants as they rise – will continue to serve Asia well. For example, even China has been a major beneficiary of the public goods provided by the US-led hierarchical system.
But this is where apparent weakness is actually strength. This interdependent relationship means that the US leader of the hierarchical system is not so powerful that it can readily ignore the wishes of key states in the region. America is not a Hobbesian Leviathian with absolute authority and power, and not even a hegemon. Indeed, Beijing’s strategists are frequently puzzled by the lack of ‘balancing’ that takes places against the US in the region. This is puzzling only if we characterize Asia as being multipolar rather than hierarchical.
In fact, any balancing tends to take place in order to preserve the hierarchy, not replace or supersede it. Other states tend to resist the bids of any Asian power to rise to the top of the pyramid – be it Japan, China or India. As a foreign based power, the US needs the cooperation of Asian partners. This keeps the top dog in check. Were an Asian country like China to rise to the top, it would not need the same level of acquiescence from the region to maintain its position. Beijing would not need the same level of regional cooperation to maintain its regional military footholds.
As China and India rise, and Japan becomes more ‘normal’, these countries will balance each other within the US-led hierarchy to ensure that the US remains on top and the other doesn’t dominate. If China seeks to launch a bid for regional hegemony, it will find it difficult to resist the structural constraints placed on it within this hierarchy.
US power is in relative decline but that is not a bad thing. False triumphantism breeds ill-discipline. But a sense of strategic vulnerability breeds interdependency and that has always been the nature of successful US leadership in Asia.
Dr John Lee is a Foreign Policy Fellow at The Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney and a Visiting Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington. His most recent book is Will China Fail?
