Opinion & Commentary
What does China really want from the Pacific?
Why is China so interested in the Pacific? After all, despite the differences in size, population, wealth, and influence between China and islands in the region, the Chinese have literally rolled out the red carpet for Pacific leaders.
Meetings between Chinese and Pacific leaders are not perfunctory ‘meet and greets’ in the bland boardrooms of hotels.
They are often elaborate state functions with all the bells and whistles that state meetings can offer.
There is even an official Action Plan of Economic Development and Cooperation between the China and the region—a forum that meets every four years.
For some, these gestures simply indicate good intentions and China’s interest in the Pacific presents opportunities for both sides.
If such a growing economy in the world wants to do business with you, then why not go with the flow?
For others, there is no such thing as a free lunch. There is always a price to pay and China’s interest in the Pacific is something to be wary about.
So what do the Chinese really want?
Don’t be too fooled by the lure of the massive Chinese market. True, a developing nation of 1.3 billion people needs raw materials and China does not have anywhere near enough of these raw materials.
They are therefore looking where ever they can to find them.
For example, this explains China’s current interest in Papua New Guinea, especially its timber and mineral deposits such as copper, zinc and nickel.
There is also some preliminary interest in the vast quantities of minerals such as manganese and cobalt on the Pacific seabed that covers about 20 million square kilometres.
The better the relations with key islands in the Pacific, the more fruitful the negotiation process will be for the Chinese should these minerals ever be mined.
However, the prospect of economic gain is not the driving force for China’s interest in the region.
To be sure, high-level exchanges between delegations and contacts among government officials is all well and good.
But the Pacific currently lacks the economic, physical, and legal infrastructure to exploit its resources.
Finding partners from both sides with similar expectations in terms of the size and scale of investment projects, as well as what they expect from each other has tended to be unsuccessful. The potential for a mismatch is immense.
Besides, economic gain is not the primary Chinese motivation. What is it all about then?
In a word, the Chinese want ‘influence’. China sends more diplomats around the world than any other country.
They have learnt quickly that sending diplomats is generally much more effective (and cheaper) than sending warships.
This does not mean there is necessarily something sinister behind Chinese intentions. But it does indicate an increasingly confident and ambitious power.
In terms of the Pacific, there is a more disturbing game being played out, namely the ‘chequebook diplomacy’, that is taking place between China and Taiwan in their competition for diplomatic recognition at the expense of the other.
Taiwan matters profoundly to China—and it is largely why China is interested in the Pacific.
Why all the fuss about Taiwan?
The defacto standing of Taiwan as an independent state is an affront to the Chinese.
Ask any mainland Chinese and almost none would tolerate formal Taiwanese independence. Taiwan’s ‘recalcitrance’ represents the modern manifestation of China’s ‘century and a half of humiliation’ at the hands of foreign powers: beginning from their defeat by the British during the Opium Wars in the 1840s, to the wars with Japan in the 1930s and 1940s, and finally Chiang Kai-shek’s escape to Taiwan followed by American protection.
Integrating Taiwan into mainland China would be tremendous validation of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy as the rightful rulers of modern China.
Losing Taiwan, according to some analysts, would be a fatal blow to the CCP’s domestic credibility.
Diplomatic recognition of China or Taiwan by islands states in the Pacific is part of this struggle. Conducting relations in the Pacific in this way creates losers on all sides. For China and Taiwan, engaging in this kind of policy is certainly damaging to their international reputations.
Moreover, as Susan Windybank reported, ‘cheque-book’ diplomacy is not causing problems between the islands states but it is certainly adding to them.
Maybe Pacific politicians could not care less about whether they recognise China or Taiwan but when large sums of foreign money are given to political leaders for their diplomatic allegiance, it is a recipe for worsening corruption—and so it has proved.
In addition, the potential conflicts of interests for a Pacific leader reliant on Chinese (or Taiwanese) money when negotiating economic agreements on behalf of their state is immense.
No doubt, the Pacific also needs to assess the pros and cons of China’s ‘smile diplomacy’ and the darker side of China’s helping hand. Kiribati serves as a prime example of these risks.
Business and politics don't mix
When the small island broke with their policy of 23 years and formally recognised Taiwan, China severed diplomatic ties and halted all aid, infrastructure and medical support.
China then held out the carrot of resumption of previous relations once recognition of Taiwan was abandoned.
China is open for business and the world - including the Pacific—is better off for it. Most experts agree that China’s interest in the Pacific will increase rather than decline.
But China’s interest is driven by politics, not economics.
Business people in the Pacific dazzled by the size of the Chinese market should take a more sober view of these driving forces.
In a country where much of business is closely linked with, and controlled by, the regime, Chinese business and politics will always mix.
In the case of the Pacific, politics is in the driving seat. A genuinely ‘free-lunch’ is a rare thing in foreign relations.
While there is some criticism emerging from the Pacific about the policies of traditional regional powers—Australia and New Zealand—China’s interest presents new opportunities but should give rise to serious concerns.
Dr John Lee is a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney. He is the author of Will China Fail? and is Managing Director of L21 research company. Dr Lee holds a PhD from Oxford as well as Arts and Law degrees from UNSW.
