Opinion & Commentary
Out of whack with Asia
Earlier this month, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd argued that Australia should learn lessons from the set-up of the European Union and seek to lead and promote an Asia-Pacific community. Last week, he was in Jakarta fresh from visiting his counterpart in Tokyo.
In response to Mr Rudd's comments, Australia's most recent Labor prime minister Paul Keating, himself a strong advocate of Australian engagement with Asia and one of the key figures behind the formation of Apec, told the press that Mr Rudd's proposal would be 'a very difficult task and not necessarily an appropriate one'.
Mr Keating is correct - the proposal is politically impossible. But more than that, the proposal shows that for all his undoubted foreign affairs expertise, Mr Rudd is displaying a worrying lack of understanding of the security dynamics driving developments in Asia.
Australian Labor leaders since Mr Gough Whitlam, who was in office from 1972 to 1975, have had a near obsession with building a 'security architecture' in the Asia-Pacific region. There is nothing inherently wrong with this - provided that the major players in the region want it and see it as being in their interest. If not, those behind it are more likely to annoy and even antagonise Asian states.
Let's face it: Much of this is about 'managing' China's rise. There has not been in recent history a powerful China as well as a powerful Japan - let alone a powerful India too - in our neighbourhood. But it is China which poses the biggest dilemmas.
China is not democratic. Its military capability and intentions are far from transparent and its geo-political aims are unclear. How the region responds to the rise of these countries - China especially - will determine how it fares over the next few decades.
China's rising economic clout is naturally exerting a pull in the region. But the major players in the region have wisely caught on to World Bank president Robert Zoellick's idea of encouraging China to be a 'responsible stakeholder'. This means persuading China that it will have much to gain from peacefully integrating into the existing political and security order, and much to lose by trying to shake it up or defy it.
This 'responsible stakeholder' idea does not offer the region with a predetermined strategy in dealing with China. It will require regional leaders to come up with an appropriate mix of carrots and sticks as developments occur.
China is now more integrated into the region economically - and increasingly politically as well - than it has been in recent history. But its foreign policy still shows a side to it that is deeply worrying - for example its chequebook diplomacy in the Pacific or its support for regimes such as those in Myanmar, North Korea and Iran.
China yearns to be the dominant political and naval power in East and South-east Asia. This means finding the balance of 'give and take' in persuading China to be a 'responsible stakeholder' will be difficult. Give too much and China will feel little pressure to compromise or be more transparent about its intentions and capabilities. Take too much and China will increasingly want to buck the existing system.
Why is the thrust of Mr Rudd's speech out of whack in terms of the appropriate balance of 'give and take' vis-a-vis China?
Australia has a relatively benign view of China's long-term political and security intentions. In contrast, Japan and India watch China's rise warily. Without exception, Asean has knocked back every Chinese proposal for greater cooperation on 'hard' security matters, preferring instead to sign agreements only on 'soft' security arrangements, such as those dealing with terrorism and trafficking humans and drugs.
Asean has even politely knocked back every Chinese proposal to include 'hard' security matters in the agenda of forums that do not include the United States. Asean even rejected China's offer to join the South-east Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (which the US rejects), explaining the rejection by saying it prefers all nuclear powers to join at the same time.
This shows a clear reluctance to allow China to out-manoeuvre other major powers on hard security matters. For all the enthusiastic talk about 'security architecture' coming out of Australia, all the major Asian powers prefer the US to continue to take the lead in security matters. For example, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand have all reinforced and upgraded their military ties with the US in the last few years whilst rejecting a greater security role for the Chinese.
Forming a 'security community' that includes China is not just 'politically impossible' as former prime minister Keating suggests. It is also out of whack with the balance that key Asian states consider appropriate in terms of how much to 'give' to China at the present time.
Significantly, the Chinese were the strongest supporter of Mr Rudd's idea. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang quickly responded, saying that 'enhanced cooperation' would be 'win-win' for all. Most other Asian members will be polite but Australia will stand largely alone on this one.
Singapore wants regional cooperation on many issues such as transnational crime and drugs. But it would do well to stay well away from Mr Rudd's broader Asia-Pacific vision.
Dr John Lee is a visiting fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney.
