Opinion & Commentary
Democracy’s slowboat to China getting slower
Figures released suggest that in early 2009, there will be over 200 million Internet users in China which will be more than in the US. It is not just about the numbers of Chinese going online. Everything from economic reforms to the rise of the middle class, and even granting Beijing the Olympics was meant to hasten the arrival of democracy in China. But since the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, the country seems to be further away from political reform and democracy now than it was then.
What happened? After all, the circumstances seem ripe for democratisation.
China has a growing middle class of around 100-200 million (depending on how we define the term) who drink Starbucks, wear Hugo Boss, play video games, go snowboarding when on holidays, and spend over 2 billion hours online each week.
These middle classes are making more and more decisions about how they want to live, and are increasingly becoming more diverse and independent in how and what they think. Almost every instance of democratisation in the latter part of the twentieth century was led by the urban middle classes. If the social mobility of these classes begins to significantly outpace old and oppressive political institutions, the latter will eventually have to reform or else face dangerous tensions.
Then there is the strong correlation between free and open markets, and free societies. Successful free and open markets depend on individual initiative, transparency, rule of law, and limited government – elements that do not sit well with closed, authoritarian systems. Prior to reforms in 1978, China’s private sector produced less than 1 percent of output. Today Shanghai feels like a shining, new, cosmopolitan city. There are now 30 million private businesses in China producing over 70 percent of its national output.
Yet, political reform has stalled over the past decade.Thhe overwhelming majority of China’s elites – entrepreneurs, professionals, intellectuals, students, journalists, and so on – have become disinterested in political reform. When pressed, most express support for the political status quo and are even critical of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.
In fact, these elites are the fastest growing groups wanting to become members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). There are currently around 70 million card carrying CCP members. Almost a quarter of these are professionals and skilled workers. A third are college students and another third are businesspeople. These elites, who were meant to lead the push toward democratization, have become the Party’s newest and strongest supporters.
The common mistake in the West is to assume that while China’s society and economy is rapidly changing, its authoritarian political institutions remain static. Those too quick to proclaim democracy on the horizon in China have underestimated the determination, capacity, and resourcefulness of the regime in its efforts to remain in power.
China’s rising prosperity has actually enhanced the capacity of the Party to remain in power in many respects. Political reform and democracy in China has stalled and even wound back using some very effective strategies designed to tie the future of the middle class to the future of the CCP.
First, authoritarian regimes become irrelevant at their peril. To preserve its economic relevance, the Chinese regime has gone to extensive efforts to maintain control of the major levers of economic power. This control is the heart of an economic structure that entrenches the role and position of Party members in Chinese economy and society. Around a dozen key segments of the economy—including banking, construction, infrastructure, media, and telecommunications—are dominated by state-owned-enterprises (SOEs). The state still owns a majority of the country’s fixed assets and receives over two-thirds of the country’s capital.
Second, the CCP has conducted a tireless and largely successful campaign to co-opt, and in many respects create, the rising educated and economic classes. By controlling the most important industries, the bulk of the country’s capital (through state-owned-banks,) as well as overseeing an extensive system of awards, promotions, and regulation, the government continues to control and dispense a dominant share of the most valued economic, professional, and intellectual opportunities.
This means that entrepreneurs are better off doing business as a ‘partner’ of the state. Intellectuals and academics favoured by officials are granted generous research grants, are fast tracked into senior positions, and are given other perks. Journalists have little choice but to work for media outlets that are still subsidiaries of Party organs. These are the contented middle classes emerging in China today. Far from being an independent class, why would these middle classes want to change toward a more democratic system when it could lead to their own dispossession?
The CCP’s hold on power remains vulnerable to a profound economic shock such as a significant downturn in economic growth. This would impede the regime’s continued capacity to co-opt and appease. Regardless, a Chinese middle class that looks and acts the same as we do in the West might nevertheless think very differently when it comes to democracy and the future of the country.
Dr John Lee’s report Putting Democracy on Hold in China was released by the Centre for Independent Studies on Wednesday 28 May.
