Opinion & Commentary
Failing to deliver on policy promises came back to bite
Eight months ago, Kevin Rudd was Australia’s highest polling prime minister. But on June 24 when he was dumped by his Labor Party, he was a blubbing mess, no doubt wondering where it had all gone wrong.
When Prime Minister John Key was interviewed about the sudden turn of events, he seemed as puzzled about it as Mr Rudd. So what can New Zealand politicians learn from Mr Rudd’s downfall?
Mr Rudd, a former bureaucrat and diplomat, was elected on a wave of euphoric hyperbole and promises of doing the big, symbolic things the Australian people disliked former prime minister John Howard for not doing – signing the Kyoto protocol, apologising to the Aboriginal stolen generations and repealing ‘Workchoices’, a labour market liberalisation policy.
Paradoxically, Mr Rudd reassured the electorate that he would be a nicer version of Mr Howard – a social and fiscal conservative and a Christian, but much cooler.
The problem for Mr Rudd was that apart from the easy and popular symbolic stuff such as the Kyoto protocol and the apology, he didn’t deliver on his other policy promises – the ones that actually affect most Australians.
His demise is a lesson in the importance of quality policy. He was not deserted by the electorate for being irritating and hypocritical, although this expedited the process (especially within the Labor Party. where he was viscerally disliked).
He was rejected for poor policies that the public disliked and that he couldn’t explain.
Take four of Mr Rudd’s big policy areas that helped sink his leadership – the home insulation scheme, building the education revolution, climate change policy and the resource super profits tax.
Mr Rudd called climate change ‘the greatest moral challenge of our time,’ arguing that delaying an emissions trading scheme was ‘absolute cowardice . . . an absolute failure of leadership’. But he had no compunction about dropping the ETS when it became unpopular.
The voters marked him down not for abandoning an ETS per se, for which support (especially in marginal mortgage–belt seats) had seriously ebbed, but because he welshed on a deal he made with the electorate for expedient poll–driven reasons. Contrast the hyperbole and unintelligible bureaucratese with the decidedly average results.
The education and home insulation schemes were rolled out as fiscal stimulus in response to the global financial crisis. The idea was to offer free or subsidised insulation for thousands of homes, and fund new classrooms, libraries and gyms in schools throughout Australia.
This would help combat climate change and energy bills through insulation and provide children with better facilities, while simultaneously providing employment.
Not surprisingly, both schemes supercharged the industries and ended up in massive rorts – the education policy saw massive price gouging and the insulation scheme has seen shonky insulations causing hundreds of roof fires, electrified roofs and, sadly, deaths.
Mr Rudd and his inner circle of advisers had a warped idea of what a Soviet–style centralised bureaucracy, run out of Canberra, could achieve. Apart from not admitting they got anything wrong, Mr Rudd took responsibility and apologised for these failings, thus personalising what was also the fault of several senior figures in his government.
Voters were naturally sceptical about the government’s ability to formulate good policy, but the final straw came with the resource super profits tax.
This 40 % tax on ‘super profits’ was defined as any return above the government bond rate of 6 %. It would pay for a drop in company tax rates and supposedly fund superannuation concessions.
It was purely a political calculation – that taking money from non– voters (mining companies) and giving it to voters (other businesses and everyone with a super fund) would be a winner with the electorate.
It backfired terribly. The public saw the proposal for the cynical, redistributive and political ploy that it was – a tax on jobs and prosperity.
This summed up Mr Rudd’s problem. He was good at promising things but not delivering. And what was delivered was rarely good policy. His leadership was ultimately lost because he didn’t understand the limitations of centralised power, mistook process for progress and used overblown rhetoric for some pretty meagre policy changes.
In the end, he sacrificed long– term policy integrity for short–term popularity and marginalised virtually everyone, especially his own party.
Former Australian prime minister Paul Keating used to say that ‘good policy is good politics’. He maintained that if politicians work to justify unpopular but quality long–term policy, the electorate will recognise and reward it. Considering what has happened to Mr Rudd, this should provide both a note of warning and some encouragement for Mr Key and his government.
A warning to steer clear of daft, short–term poll–driven populism and encouragement that his government has taken a longer–term view, as outlined in the Budget, and that ministers are out there arguing constantly for medium–term reforms. The lesson for Mr Key and the Government is that centralised decision– making and short–term populism, though tempting, can never make up for quality long–term policy.
