There is excitement throughout Asia over Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s choice of the continent for her maiden international voyage in her capacity as America’s top diplomat, bypassing the more traditional choices of Europe or the Middle East. This is good thinking from the new administration. Global economic power continues to shift to Asia, despite the current global crisis. But leaving India out signalled a lack of forward thinking and in doing so, the Obama administration missed an exceptional opportunity.

The choice of destinations for the inaugural visit by the American Secretary of State was not decided lightly. It is a signalling of intent and an insight into the administration’s priorities.

For some, Secretary Clinton’s schedule appeared flawless. A visit to China is mandatory in any Asian schedule. Key allies such as Japan and South Korea were duly included. Indonesia – the world’s most populous Islamic country, a bustling democracy, the remerging power in Southeast Asia, and President Obama’s home for four of his formative years – was a clever choice. But a visit to India – the world’s largest democracy and one of the emerging poles of political and economic power – would have been an inspired one.

In contrast to the waning US-Pakistan relationship, America’s engagement with India is blossoming. The US-India nuclear pact discussed since 2005 and signed in mid 2007 was a significant milestone for relations between the two countries. As the former American Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns – who played a key role in the negotiations – declared, the agreement signalled the beginning of a ‘strategic partnership’ between the two nations. It is noteworthy that the term ‘strategic partnership’ has not yet been used to characterise the Sino–US relationship even though President Nixon initiated it back in 1972.

But while the India-US bilateral relationship continues to evolve, the concern is that America under Obama will continue to take a narrow, unimaginative view of the broader strategic opportunities of partnership with India.

American strategy in Asia is preoccupied with ‘managing’ the rise of China. Key Asian allies such as Japan were greatly excited by various approaches, such as the one promulgated by former US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage who pushed for the idea of working with existing American allies and security partners to ‘shape’ the future of Asia. This means reaffirming security alliances with countries such as Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore and Australia. It also means deepening relations with American security partners such as Malaysia. Under a McCain presidency, it would also have meant trying to bring in India as a partner in shaping the future security foundations of the region.

This strategy was designed to not only improve American standing and influence in the region but to also ‘manage’ the rise of China. Under these approaches, America recognised that its interregnum as an undisputed hegemony in the region was gradually declining. But by working with current allies and new partners to shape the rules and institutions of the region, the plan was to prevent future Chinese mischief and persuade China that it is better to play by agreed rules than to subvert or revise them.

To be sure, India takes seriously its long-standing status as an ‘independent’ rising power. Few things would be more unpalatable to New Delhi than being passed off as an American lackey. But there are reasons to believe that a US-India partnership is plausible. For example, Washington would be happy to allow New Delhi a growing pre-eminence in the Indian Ocean. Despite some cooperation, tensions between New Delhi and Beijing remain, especially since China’s militarisation the Tibetan plateau. It is estimated that China has deployed around one quarter of its nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles in Tibet. India might not agree to become one spoke in America’s ‘hub-and-spokes’ model of security alliances in the region; but New Delhi and Washington have common strategic interests when it comes to ‘managing’ China. An emerging India-US partnership should be an essential pillar of this ‘shaping’ strategy.

Although Obama’s Asian strategy is still being formed, the fear is that the centrepiece of the current administration’s regional security strategy – which largely means ‘managing China’s rise – will be to deepen its relationship with China. Critically, this might be done primarily through direct and bilateral engagement with the Chinese, while partners such as Japan and perhaps India are left on the sidelines.
American appreciation of the possibilities for India’s role in the region have historically been poor. India’s absence from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum is an enormous oversight which has not helped. But any future American grand strategy in Asia, especially with respect to a rising China, cannot exclude India if it is to be successful. Secretary Clinton would have done well, and displayed admirable foresight and creativity, had New Delhi been a part of her inaugural overseas trip.

Dr John Lee is a Foreign Policy Fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies, Sydney. His latest book Will China Fail? was published in 2007.