Opinion & Commentary
China’s much lauded ‘charm offensive’ is hitting a wall
Chinese soft power – the ability to get what it wants through persuasion and attraction rather than using the age old approach of carrots and sticks – has a long way to go, especially in Australia. To Beijing’s frustration, the harder China tries to engage and impress the world – think of the US$40 billion spent on the Olympics – the more threatening China appears.
Even its leaders and top thinkers admit that China’s ‘soft power’ is fragile. But it has not been due to a lack of trying. According to one former senior Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, China is the most self-conscious rising power in world history. Enormous efforts are spent on trying to improve its image. For example, Beijing has more diplomats in more capitals than any other country, including America. They come from the cream of the crop and undertake extensive foreign language and cultural instruction so that they are the best trained in the world. By 2010, there will be over 500 Confucius Institutes in almost 100 countries teaching Chinese language and culture to over 100 million people.
The idea is that by building its stores of soft power, it will be able to more effectively deploy its growing hard power resources, especially capital, around the world and maximise returns as well as influence. Diplomatic efforts over the past 15 years have convinced us that China is a legitimate rising great power. But many are still to be convinced that it will be a benign one. This issue has become more important now that the relative shift of economic power from West to East has become more apparent.
Adding to problems is that Beijing performs a double act every day. On the one hand, it is desperate to promote China as a successful and confident country to gain international respect, as well as legitimacy for its authoritarian approach. And on the other hand, Chinese leaders are profoundly aware of weaknesses that could bring down the regime and cause chaos throughout the country. For example, despite three decades of economic growth, approximately half of the population lives on US$2 a day or less. Illiteracy has actually doubled since 2000. China has become the most unequal country in all of Asia and also one of the most corrupt. Officially recorded instances of mass unrest reached 87,000 in 2005 according to the most recent figures. Chinese economists remain gravely concerned about the sustainability of its economic approach.
Ironically, while many in countries like Australia fear China’s perceived growing strength, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) fears China’s weakness. As Chinese President Hu Jintao repeatedly warns, hostile foreign forces have not given up hopes of Westernising and carving up a vulnerable China.
The image of a secure and confident China is a staged act. China remains an insecure power governed by an insecure regime. Yet, the CCP has staked its legitimacy on returning prosperity and respect to China and its people. In an attempt to remain relevant, in power, and in control, the CCP’s response has been to expand its role and influence throughout Chinese society and economy rather than reduce it. Even if there are strong reasons to believe that one-Party rule is the source of many of modern China’s problems, Beijing maintains that a strong, authoritarian apparatus is needed to steer the ship of state and avoid chaos in a country of 1.3 billion people.
Widening the Party’s role has another purpose. All Chinese economic and social organisations are considered by the CCP to be potential instruments of state. The more control by the state in more areas, the greater their value as possible diplomatic assets. This has been one part of Beijing’s deliberate strategy in its pursuit of what it calls ‘comprehensive national power.’ This all-encompassing conception of the instruments of state power coupled with the extensive role of the Party in Chinese economy and society is at the heart of China’s ‘soft power’ image problem.
We are now realising that the hand of the state is never far from the surface when it comes to China’s largest, most successful, and prestigious organisations – the same ones wanting to buy into Australian mining companies. Furthermore, the most influential Chinese individuals around the world, even private citizens, are usually well connected political insiders. State-controlled firms receive over three quarters of all domestic capital even as they produce barely one quarter of the country’s output. Of the approximately 1,500 companies listed on its two stock exchanges, less than 50 are genuinely private. The CCP is now the Party for elites. It is rare to succeed without political connections. One third of its 75 million members are successful entrepreneurs; one third college graduates; and one quarter professionals.
Unfortunately for Beijing, the depths of Chinese ‘state corporatism’ – the extent of which far exceeds what occurred in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan as these states were rising - breeds distrust in the West. So too does opaque transparency of means and ends within its institutions which Beijing exploits to both dilute accountability and conceal vulnerabilities. The CCP is convinced only its leadership can restore greatness to China. But many in Australia see it as a self-serving regime using the prosperity of the country to hold on to power. Even when its state-controlled entities are busy maximising profits, as firms should do, there is a suspicion that they exist to extend the Party’s power and influence.
Ultimately, allowing China’s top firms to buy into local companies, and even accepting free trips from Australian-Chinese citizens with influence in China, will lead many to perceive that we are contributing to enlarging and entrenching Beijing’s vast, authoritarian network. Chinese ‘soft power’ is hitting a wall. Unless the CCP is prepared to loosen its grip on Chinese economy and society, many will continue to believe that there are more demons and conspiracies hiding in the shadows.
Dr John Lee is a Visiting Fellow at The Centre for Independent Studies. An updated version of his book Will China Fail? was published by CIS in late 2009.
