Opinion & Commentary
For once it’s better to end with a whimper
Washington has pulled out all the stops for President Barack Obama’s first state visitor: Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the leader of the world’s largest democracy.
But many fear that the meeting will begin with a bang only to end with a whimper – with a communique filled with little more than platitudes about ‘shared values’ and a desire to deepen strategic cooperation between the two countries.
But for once, let’s hope that this indeed is the case – in public at least. Because when it comes to India, the less said about what Washington and New Delhi are doing and plan to do, the more likely the building of a solid foundation for a genuine strategic relationship.
But first things first: Why does India matter?
For American liberals, it makes sense for the world’s most powerful democracy to offer a strategic hand to the world’s most populous democracy. But India is not only democratic.
For realists, the enemy of my potential enemy – that is, China – is my friend. New Delhi has been warily balancing and competing against Beijing from the very moment of India’s creation in 1947. Even now, there is tension in the disputed Indian province of Arunachal Pradesh.
China’s nuclear weapons stationed on the neighbouring Tibetan Plateau are frighteningly real for India. New Delhi as well as the rest of Asia is carefully watching Beijing’s naval build-up as it far exceeds what is needed to prevent Taiwanese secession – the official reason given in Beijing’s defence white paper. Although Pakistan is on India’s immediate radar, China is the clear strategic competitor.
Importantly, India has capabilities built on the back of a population that will be larger than China’s in several decades, – and with a much better age-demographic; and an economy that has been booming since 1991.
To be sure, the continued success of India’s economic reform programme – the key to its continued rise – is far from assured. But already India has a vibrant and thriving middle class of 300 million people. This means it has a critical mass of people generating economic resources needed to entrench New Delhi’s status as a major centre of power in Asia.
Then there is its military – size still matters. India has the third largest military in the world; it is developing a highly effective navy, including a fully operational aircraft carrier with plans for several more; and it is a nuclear-armed power. Moreover, India’s political leaders have shown that they are not afraid to use its military.
The mere existence of a confident India acts as a structural and strategic constraint against Chinese ambitions and actions in South and South-east Asia. Importantly, the United States-India partnership is getting ‘buy in’ from key states in Asia which do not feel nervous or threatened by India’s rise.
For example, New Delhi already conducts extensive naval exercises with Jakarta, and increasingly with Tokyo, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur.
But this is where the virtue of subtlety comes in. Indian political, strategic and social elites prize strategic ‘independence’ – or at least, the appearance of it. India will not allow itself to become perceived as a dutiful and secondary player in any grand American strategy – designed, say, to manage China’s rise. Joint statements declaring a grand bargain with the superpower will create domestic suspicions. When it comes to relations with India, the less that is said, the less resistance Dr Singh will have to overcome on the home front.
Beyond comments about increasing cooperation in non-traditional security areas such as trade, climate change and other country-to-country links, there is also another important reason why boring public statements are good. Although many Asian states do not trust China, they do not feel comfortable with any arrangement that is explicitly designed to ‘contain’ China. China is simply too important to the regional economy and its diplomatic response could be unpredictable.
A case in point was the 2007 Quadrilateral Initiative linking the US, India, Japan and Australia. This was simply too crude an arrangement for a region constantly hedging in case China rises, America (and Japan) declines, and India stagnates.
The emergence of India as a significant strategic player in East and South-east Asia took Beijing by surprise, as did the rapid conclusion of the US-India nuclear deal last year. Beijing is watching Washington’s relationship with New Delhi with greater interest than any other at the moment.
Many are looking for irrefutable and public evidence that the US-India relationship is a provocative one designed to prevent China from rising. This would give Beijing an excuse to justify its military build-up. President Obama and Prime Minister Singh should want to ensure that no such evidence becomes available.
Dr John Lee is a Research Fellow at The Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney and a Visiting Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. He is the author of Will China Fail?
