Opinion & Commentary
PM Rudd still needing strategy lessons from Asian allies
This weekend, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd was given the honour of delivering the keynote at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue meeting in Singapore. Maybe it was a peace offering of sorts since PM Rudd had ruffled a few feathers in the region last year by putting forward a European Union style Asian-Pacific Community (APC) as the way forward – something enthusiastically praised in Beijing but comprehensively rejected by other key Asian states, as well as the American superpower.
This time, showing that he is a quick learner, Rudd backed away from any ‘utopian’ blueprint and instead spoke the language of the region by simply calling for more comprehensive and structured dialogue on a range of security and economic matters. But in one important respect, the Australian PM is proving that he is still out of sync with the region. PM Rudd believes that the current lack of strong multilateral institutions in the region means that Asia is sitting ‘idly by while the region simply evolves without any sense of strategic purpose.’ The region is stuck in a mentality characterised by ‘strategic drift.’
In fact, it is the Australian PM, not Asian states in the region, who is way behind the times. Asia has been executing a very clever strategic plan for the best part of two decades. The plan is subtle – perhaps too subtle for Rudd to recognise – and the existence of weak rather than strong multilateral institutions have been deliberate policy. As the Australian PM correctly noted, the region is fluid and dynamic, and the dangers of conflict are real. Elegant, top-down regional architecture – a seeming obsession of Rudd’s – is unsuitable in such an environment. Now that the Australian PM is learning to talk the language of the region, he would do well to observe conscientiously and learn from it.
Where is PM Rudd coming from? Current Australian thinking assumes two things: first, Asia is rushing headlong into a state of multipolarity (a configuration characterised by the rise of several states of roughly equal power); and second, Asia is unprepared for this situation.
In fact, both these assumptions are incorrect.
First of all, Asia is not rushing headlong towards a state of multipolarity. Asia is hierarchical, not multipolar.
True, American power is in relative decline but America will remain the dominant power for decades by any measurement even as China and India rises. Moreover, America has never been a genuine hegemon in the sense that it relies on the cooperation of other states to remain predominant. For example, without cooperation from allies such as Japan, Singapore and the Philippines, the US could not retain its forward military positions in the West Pacific. The US guardian is not so powerful that the US can ignore the wishes of its current partners. In other words, the hierarchy is consensual. As long as the US performs the role of ultimate protector and provider of public goods, there will be no reason for regional states to ‘balance’ against America. Indeed, Asia since World War Two is characterised by an ‘under-balancing’ vis-à-vis the US which some commentators find curious. It is only a curiosity of we characterise Asia as being multi-polar rather than hierarchical.
Second, this hierarchical structure is enormously effective in accommodating the rise of reemerging powers such as China. China is now seen as a legitimate power because it has chosen (albeit reluctantly) to rise within this hierarchical structure. China, Japan and possibly India will be the second tier powers in Asia. These three great Asian powers rising within the hierarchical structure that Asian states have constructed impose a structural constraint on each other. Critically, as China rises, it needs to do so within the existing regime of restrained competition, regional norms and other processes. This has always been the plan: to ‘socialise’ China. It is a creative alternative to the traditional options of crude ‘balancing’ or ‘bandwagoning.’ Enmeshing China in Asia (which a hierarchy implies) means that the cost of outright rebellion is too high. This grand strategy of ‘bringing China in’ by using a hierarchical framework has the advantage of constraining Beijing’s ambitions without trying to contain China or keep it down. Doing so would cause Beijing to become resentful and deny the region the economic benefits of a rising China.
This form of ‘hedging’ within the informal hierarchical system in Asia is far preferable to carving out spheres of influence for Asian powers (which is impossible since these would clash) or formalising a decisive move toward recognition of an explicit multipolar configuration which would be premature.
This is where the virtue of weak multilateral institutions comes in. Behind talk about the rules of engagement, there needs to be a big stick and serious consequences for non-compliance. Existing multilateral forums are strong enough to encourage processes that build confidence amongst members, but are not so rigid that they get in the way of members seeking parallel agreements in underpinning their own security – alliances that have so far been critical for restraining Chinese ambitions. It is no wonder that almost all Asian states reject persistent appeals by leaders such as Rudd to build more comprehensive and binding multilateral security architecture.
These weak multilateral institutions and processes, in a region underpinned by American preeminence, have created a remarkably peaceful environment for decades and is coping well with the ascent of China and India. Despite good intentions, Australian PM Rudd needs to finally get on board.
Dr John Lee is a Visiting Fellow at The Centre for Independent Studies.
