Recent conversations with Chinese political scientists brought home the great extent to which Beijing is obsessed with watching, analysing, and replicating the success of Singapore. After all, despite a mediocre global ranking for political freedom, Singapore is confident, prosperous and orderly. Meritocracy is highly valued, it’s people generally contented and society vibrant. Most appealing of all, as far as Beijing is concerned, the approval ratings for Singaporean leaders would make many democratic leaders envious. If there is a successful ‘Asian way’ of enlightened authoritarian leadership, then Singapore is by far its best example. Unfortunately, the vision is seductive but out of reach for Beijing. In reality, it was never realistic ‘and if anything Chinese is moving rapidly away from the Singapore example.

The history of Singapore proves that authoritarian systems are not always agents of economic decline. But long before Singapore became a model for authoritarian leaders around the world, the Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington suggested that ‘authoritarian transition’ could be a better way toward development for poorly industrialised countries (although he also argued that authoritarian systems ought to give way eventually to democratic ones.) After all, Europe did not gain universal suffrage until it had industrialised. The per capita income in China is still one tenth that of America’s. Over 700 million people still live on less than US$2 a day. Democracy under these circumstances might actually bring regression and chaos rather than greater prosperity and a better life for the many.

Singapore (and also Hong Kong) are pioneers in this regard. Few gave the tiny island much of a chance of success when it became a self-governing state in 1959, joined the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, and left it in acrimonious circumstances two years later. Yet, in addition to outstanding leadership, Singapore had two advantages which China does not enjoy: the advantage of size or more precisely the lack of it; and pre-existing institutions that were protected and improved upon.

When it comes to effective policy implementation – size matters. Except that the smaller the better. Singapore is a country of roughly 4.5 million people. China has 1.3 billion people. There are 45 million officials in China and only 2 percent are central authorities. No matter how enlightened Beijing’s leaders are, they are reliant on around 44 million unsupervised, poorly trained and often corrupt local officials to execute and implement. In China, there is a well known saying that resonates throughout the whole country: Heaven is high and the emperor is far away. Local officials frequently run counties like feudal lords overseeing personal fiefdoms.

This brings us to China’s second major limitation. Effective policy implementation would be much more effective if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) built better institutions. For example, Hong Kong and Singapore achieved their economic success within an authoritarian set-up. However, these city-states shared the commonality of limited government interference and predation in the economy, as well as sound institutions such as enforceable property rights and ‘rule of law. Similarly, China needs a strong civil society where rule of law exists and is enforced. Courts need to be independent and officials need to be accountable. Private property needs to be protected, individual enterprise needs to be given a chance to succeed, basic human rights must be enforced, and the government needs to be restrained. Singapore has these virtues.

True, the Peoples’ Action Party (PAP) in Singapore was ruthless against political dissidents but it either left existing British built institutions in place or built better civil ones where needed. The father of modern Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, was after all a Cambridge trained lawyer who understood the intimate relationship between good laws and their enforcement, and strong civil societies. In contrast, these in China are weak. Deteriorating institutions have actually coincided with the increased role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Chinese economy and society that occurred after the Tiananmen protests in 1989.

For example, the number of officials before and after the protests more than doubled – from 20 million to 45 million. Since the early 1990s, the CCP has retaken control of the economy. State-controlled enterprises receive over three-quarters of the country’s entire capital each year, reversing the situation prior to 1989. The private sector is denied both formal capital (i.e. bank loans) and access to the most lucrative markets which are reserved for the state-controlled sector. Only around 50 of the 1,400 listed companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange are genuinely private. Fewer than 100 of the 1,000 richest people in China are not linked to the Party. This state-corporatist model favors a relatively small number of well placed insiders. Meanwhile, a billion people are largely missing out on the fruits of GDP growth. In fact, 400 million people have seen their net incomes decline over the past decade. Absolute poverty has doubled since 2000.

This extensive role of the CCP has coincided with a rise in systemic corruption. The Party, after all, dispenses the most valued economic and professional opportunities in Chinese society. Courts at all levels are still explicitly under the control of Party organs. According to Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) studies, stealing from the public purse by officials amounts to around 2% of GDP each year; and it is rising. According to a 2003 CASS report, over 40 million households have had their lands illegally seized by corrupt and unaccountable local officials.

Levels of dissatisfaction with especially local authorities are so bad that there were 87,000 instances of mass unrest in 2005 according to official figures, rising from a few thousand in the mid 1990s. To appease unhappy citizens, Beijing has instituted a system of ‘petitions’ whereby aggrieved citizens can appeal to higher authority against their local officials. A good idea perhaps – except for the fact that of every 10,000 petitions lodged, only three are heard.

Yes, it’s true that China is still developing. But that excuse is wearing a bit thin. Reforms began in 1979. The reform period – 30 years and counting – has now lasted longer than Mao’s 27 years of terrible rule. Since then China’s economy has doubled every ten years. The middle class is approaching 100 million–200 million people depending on the definition. The building of institutions should be speeding ahead. Instead, since the Tiananmen protests in 1989, institutional building in China has in many respects gone backwards.

Peer behind the showrooms of Shanghai or Shenzhen and China is looking nothing like Singapore. Instead, look at the crumbling civil societies in Russia or Brazil for a more accurate comparison.

Dr John Lee is the Foreign Policy Fellow at The Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney and a Visiting Scholar at the Hudson Institute in Washington. The second edition of his book Will China Fail? was released in June.